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The received opinion is that symbol is an evolutionary prerequisite for syntax. This paper
shows two things: 1) symbol is not a monolithic phenomenon, and 2) symbol and syntax
must have co-evolved. I argue that full-blown syntax requires only three building blocks:
signs, concatenation, grammar (constraints on concatenation). Functional dependencies
between the blocks suggest the four-stage model of syntactic evolution, compatible with
several earlier scenarios: (1) signs, (2) increased number of signs, (3) commutative
concatenation of signs, (4) grammatical (noncommutative) concatenation of signs. The
main claim of the paper is that symbolic reference comprises up to ﬁve distinct inter-
pretative correlates: mental imagery, denotation, paradigmatic connotation, syntagmatic
connotation, and deﬁnition. I show that the correlates form an evolutionary sequence,
some stages of which can be aligned with certain stages of syntactic evolution.
 2012 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
There is a consensus that two features setting natural
language apart from non-human animal communication
are symbolic reference and semantically compositional
syntax (Deacon, 1997; Hauser, Chomsky, & Fitch, 2002;
Hurford, 2004; Nowak, Plotkin, & Jansen, 2000). Thus,
minimally, evolutionary linguistics should be concerned
with modeling speciﬁc stages1 in the evolution of either
one or the other. Elaborations of the evolution of syntax are
numerous (e.g. Bickerton, 1998, 2000; Dessalles, 2006;
Jackendoff, 1999; Johansson, 2006b; Nowak et al., 2000;
Wray, 2000), the evolution of symbol, however, has
receivedmuch less attention, as the deﬁning characteristics
of symbol as well as possible stages in its evolution remainanguage; S, stimulus;
gmail.com.
ered by implication.
ned by certain prop-
to lower (i.e. more
certain properties.
1
BY-NC-ND license.largely vague (but see Deacon, 1997). This paper presents
a model of the evolution of symbol. Contrary to the
common opinion, symbol is not a uniform monolithic
phenomenon. I start from a synchronic viewpoint – from
analyzing different cognitive correlates that emerge in
interpreting symbols. The claim is that the correlates are
mental imagery and different types of mental relations
(denotation, connotation, etc.). I show that, among
symbol’s interpretative correlates, it is possible to separate
and identify the more fundamental ones from the relative
latecomers in the evolution. The evolution of symbolic
reference is then aligned with a simple model of the
evolution of syntactic compositionality. The latter is
derived from the constraints on the evolution of syntax,
outlined by Nowak and Komarova (2001), Jackendoff
(1999), Johansson (2006b) and others.
2. Symbol: deﬁnition and timeline
As ‘symbol’ is a pretheoretic term, it has to be deﬁned
from the outset. Two features that are usually, if not
implicitly, held to be characteristic of ‘symbol’ are the
arbitrary nature of reference (a non-necessary link
between a form and its meaning) and a used potential for
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By contrast, ‘index’ and ‘icon’ are deﬁned by a necessary
and natural link between a form and its meaning (Peirce,
1998). In icons, the link is based on similarity. In indices,
it is based on any other necessary relation (e.g. cause-effect
or whole-part relation). In practice, various degrees of
iconicity as possible, and symbols (e.g. the Christian cross,
or onomatopoetic words like knock, bump, crash) may
exhibit iconicity as well. Equipped with these deﬁnitions,
one notices that the word ‘symbol’ gets colloquially used in
very different senses. For example, status symbols (e.g.
expensive clothes) have not much in common with
linguistic symbols (e.g. words). By the above deﬁnitions,
only the latter are symbols. The former are indices of
wealth and, more generally, success. Although the differ-
encemight seemminor, it has fundamental implications on
the archaeological evidence for symbolism. For example,
one cannot infer symbolism (and by extension, language)
from personal ornaments, as the most parsimonious
interpretation of personal ornaments is that they are status
symbols (Sterelny, 2008). As personal ornaments are costly,
their are indices of success. This observation is archaeo-
logically supported by the fact that the objects used in
Pleistocene pendants (mainly predator teeth and suitable
seashells) are hard to come by. As killing a predator is
evolutionarily extremely costly, it is a bona ﬁde indicator of
success. Nevertheless, it is exceedingly common to inter-
pret personal ornaments (and to a lesser extent pigment
use) as manifestations of symbolism (e.g. Bednarik, 2008b;
Chase, 1994; d’Errico et al., 2003). Observe also that
personal ornaments do not imply displaced reference, as
they bestow status only to their wearers. Thus, personal
ornaments per se are not indicators of symbolism (and, by
extension, language).
The same holds for pigment use and art (both repre-
sentational and abstract). It is very difﬁcult to rule out all
potential utilitarian uses for Middle Paleolithic pigment
pieces (medicine, hide preservative, protection from sun
and insects, camouﬂage, startling of prey and conspeciﬁcs
etc. – Barham, 2002; Sterelny, 2008; Wadley, 2001) but
even where this could be done, there remains the possi-
bility that pigment was used because deﬁnitive colors were
preferred for esthetic or cognitive (salience) reasons. Even
non-human species differentiate between esthetic and
non-esthetic stimuli and utilize deﬁnitive colors as behav-
ioral cues (Watanabe, 2010) and so do children in their ﬁrst
year (Baldwin, 2006). While coloring is probably uniquely
human, there is nothing inherently symbolic about it. For
color symbolism to be present, a non-natural, non-random
and non-availability-speciﬁc link between color and object
(or color and ﬁgure) has to be evidenced. For example,2 The above deﬁnition of symbol opens the possibility that, in natural
communication, symbolism is uniquely human. For example, while bot-
tlenose dolphins’ signature whistles are arbitrary, the whistles’ natural
potential for spatiotemporally displaced reference is not evident, as each
dolphin uses its own distinctive signature whistle (Janik et al., 2006).
Although dolphins frequently copy each other signature whistles in the
wild, it is not clear whether this qualiﬁes as a reference to third person
individuals (which would indicate a used potential for spatiotemporally
displaced reference).a brown, black or white foot ﬁgure on a cave wall is prob-
ably color iconism (reference by similarity), one purple foot
ﬁgure is probably a chance but ten purple foot ﬁgures
suggest color symbolism (except if purple was one of the
few pigments available to the artist and the others were
equally non-iconic, e.g. crimson and green). Thus,
extremely speciﬁc conﬁgurations of archeological and
geological evidence are required to attest color symbolism.
Figurative symbolism is generally easier to establish.
Importantly, as ﬁgurative paintings and sculptures are at
least partly iconic, representational art per se does not
entail symbolism. Thus, the vast majority of cave paintings
and early sculptures (including the Berekhat Ram ﬁgurine
from 0.25 mya – d’Errico et al., 2003) have to be excluded
from possible indicators of symbolism. However, some
early examples of ﬁgurative symbolism remain. For
example, the two half-lion/half-man ﬁgurines from
0.031mya (Conard, 2003) are symbolic, as they exhibit both
spatiotemporally displaced and arbitrary reference
(spatiotemporally displaced, because a half-lion/half-man
has hardly any potential to refer to anything here and
now, and arbitrary because the ﬁgurines are not repre-
sentational as wholes). By extension, the ﬁgurines are
reasonable proxies for language (or at least protolanguage).
As for abstract symbolism, one of the ﬁrst examples of
complex code appears on the La Marche antler from
0.016 mya (d’Errico, 1995). Simple codes are probably in
evidence since at least the Ishango bone from c. 0.02 mya
(Bogoshi, Naidoo, & Webb, 1987; Brooks & Smith, 1987).
Both types of codes imply symbolism. Earlier examples
tend to fall into a category of ’abstract art’ for which
doodling is a more parsimonious explanation than
symbolism (Bednarik, 1995a; Halverson, 1995). For
example, Bednarik’s (1995a) paper on concept-mediated
marking in Lower Paleolithic makes no allegations as to
the symbolicity or even intentionality of the markings. The
markings that Bednarik (1995a) analyzed were abstract,
and some of them were very similar to those Middle
Paleolithic markings found on bone and ocher pieces from
Blombos Cave that are claimed to be “irrefutable evidence
of symbolic behavior” (d’Errico et al., 2003, p. 4). The claim
relies, of course, on a pretheoretic notion of symbol.
In general, cupules are better candidates for symbols
than other forms of ’abstract art’ because their manufacture
is labor intensive, which rules out doodling as well as
coincidental conﬁgurations of cut marks (Bednarik, 1995b,
2008a, 2008b). At the same time, it is plausible that some
cupules (at least those on horizontal surfaces) were used as
containers or were unintentional byproducts of other
functional activities (e.g. grinding). Although a functional
role does not preclude a symbolic use, it makes cupules’
status as an evidence of symbolism ambiguous. Neverthe-
less, cupules are seemingly a later addition to hominins’
behavioral repertoire than personal ornaments (at least
0.15 and 0.3 mya, respectively – Bednarik, 2008a, 2008b).
Although emotional attachment is a more parsimonious
explanation for burials than symbolism (Sterelny, 2008),
grave goods, structures and their conﬁgurations can point
to symbolism as well. A Neanderthal burial site, La Ferras-
sie, dated to at least 0.04 mya, suggests a possible symbolic
activity (Bednarik, 1995a, 2008a). The ﬁnd that was
3 At this point, it might be useful to compare two best-known models
of sign. Peirce’s (1955 [1910]) model is Sign Vehicle – Object – Inter-
pretant, Saussure’s (1983 [1916]) Signiﬁer-Signiﬁed. Given the sequence
O1–S1–I1(O2)–S2–I2 (S(ign Vehicle), O(bject), I(nterpretant); I1(O2) means
I1 viewed as O2), we have 2 Peirce’s signs (O1–S1–I1, (O2)–S2–I2) but up to
4 Saussure’s signs (O1–S1, S1–I1, (O2)–S2, S2–I2), i.e. any Peirce’s sign can be
converted to Saussure’s signs (with S corresponding to signiﬁer and O
and/or I to signiﬁed). However, not all Saussure’s signs can be converted
to Peirce’s signs. Thus, Saussure’s analysis picks out signs where Peirce’s
cannot but the inverse does not hold. One reason is that Saussure’s sign is
more elementary. Another is that Peirce’s sign is based on communica-
tion, which can be restricted. Some communicative contexts lack objects
while others lack interpretants but signiﬁer and signiﬁed are always
present. For example, the reader of a book (esp. of ﬁction) has, more often
than not, no access to the object, i.e. the author’s interpretation. He can
interpret it but the result is another interpretant, not the object in the
communication that the book (presumably) constitutes. Analogously, an
encrypted message lacks an interpretant for a casual observer. In both
contexts, we have Saussure’s signs (in Peirce’s terms, S–I and S–O, resp.)
but no Peirce’s sign, i.e. the former is more universal.
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was a limestone slab with 18 cupules (16 of which were
arranged in pairs), covering a child’s corpse.
By far the oldest evidence for symbolism we have is
circumstantial and, ironically, it is evidence for language,
the most elusive form of symbolism archaeologically. It is
well known that Homo erectus crossed at least 19 km of
open sea to colonize Flores c. 0.85 mya or earlier (Gibbons,
1998a; Morwood, O’Sullivan, Aziz, & Raza, 1998). It has
been (plausibly) argued that watercraft manufacture and
navigation entail a level of communication that would be
unattainable without (proto)language. Although rafting on
ﬂotsam is a possibility (Gibbons, 1998a), it is not a likely
one, given H. erectus’s ability to manufacture mode 2 tools
and successful colonization of much of the OldWorld (from
Africa and Western Europe to Java, China and, possibly,
Central Siberia – Ascenzi, Benvenuti, & Segre, 1997; Asfaw
et al., 2002; Bar-Yosef & Belfer-Cohenb, 2001; Gibbons,
1998b; Larick et al., 2001; Waters, Forman, & Pierson,
1997). Furthermore, it is now established that H. erectus
was anatomically capable of (some form of) spoken
language, whereas it’s evolutionary predecessors austra-
lopithecines were not (MacLarnon & Hewitt, 1999; Meyer,
Lordkipanidze, & Vekua, 2006). As some of the associated
anatomical changes in the vocal tract have evolutionary
costs (Fitch, 2000b), it follows that there was selective
pressure to evolve enhanced vocalizations. The only
reasonable explanation for this pressure is oral communi-
cation. Thus, four independent and converging pieces of
evidence – H. erectus’ colonization of Flores (and much of
the other Old World); its evolutionarily new anatomic
capacity for spoken language; a selective pressure for
enhanced vocalizations in H. erectus; and oral communi-
cation as the most plausible explanation to this pressure –
point to some kind of language in H. erectus prior to its
colonization of Flores. Of course, the evidence is circum-
stantial but this is always the case in language evolution –
the earliest direct evidence for language (an inscription on
a wooden tablet – Whitley, 2003) is from less than
0.01 mya.
As Homo habilis, the ﬁrst known Homo species (with the
earliest occurrence c. 2.3 mya – Spoor et al., 2007), was not
scrutinized by MacLarnon and Hewitt (1999), it is possible
that this species was anatomically adapted to spoken
language as well. According to Tobias (1998), evidence from
endocranial casts suggests that H. habilis was a speaker.
When combined, the archaeological and anatomical
evidence indicate that H. erectus (and possibly even H.
habilis) used some kind of (proto)language, the emergence
of which could be bracketed between 0.9 and 2.3 mya. At
present, this constitutes the earliest evidence of
symbolism. Previously, the time when language evolved
has been constrained to between 0.5 and 5mya (Johansson,
2006a).
3. The hierarchical nature of symbolic reference
Terrence Deacon has argued for a hierarchical nature of
symbolic reference (Deacon, 1997). Contrary to the
commonly held view of symbol (Bickerton, 2003;
Christiansen & Kirby, 2003), Deacon’s symbols are notdeﬁned by arbitrary reference (in fact, he suggests that
indices may be arbitrary as well) but by a closed group of
transformations that links them in order to refer:
“/—/ words need to be in context with other words, in
phrases and sentences, in order to have any determinate
reference. /—/ Symbolic reference derives from combi-
natorial possibilities and impossibilities, and we there-
fore depend on combinations both to discover it (during
learning) and to make sense of it (during communica-
tion)” (Deacon, 1997, p. 83).
“Thus, not only is symbolic reference a distributed
relationship, so is its mnemonic support. /—/ How else
could the many thousands of different words we use
every day be retrieved so rapidly and effortlessly during
the act of speaking or listening?” (Deacon, 1997, p. 97).
Deacon’s deﬁnition of symbol conﬁnes it to human
communication systems only. Arbitrary reference, on the
other hand, is not uniquely human. Whether vervet
monkey alarm calls are arbitrary or not is controversial – at
best it makes sense to say that there is an extent to which
they are arbitrary (Cheney & Seyfarth, 2005; Deacon, 1997;
Owren & Rendall, 2001). But assuming they are arbitrary,
there are other aspects that distinguish them from NL
symbols (expressions). First, they seem to be produced
involuntarily. Second, different sexes produce different
alarm calls (Owren & Rendall, 2001, p. 64). Similarly,
although European starlings are excellent mimics and can
adopt new motifs from their acoustic environment into
their songs, the variability is non-arbitrary in the sense that
(1) the song structure is preserved (Chaiken, 2004), and (2)
it serves to prevent receiver boredom or habituation (cf.
Rendall, Owren, & Ryan, 2009). If we generalize the point by
comparing the use of (possibly) arbitrary signs in six
species (Chaiken, Böhner, & Marler, 1993; Cheney &
Seyfarth, 1990; Eens, Pinxten, & Verheyen, 1992; Hurford,
2004; Janik, Sayigh, & Wells, 2006; Pepperberg, 1987,
2000; Savage-Rumbaugh, Shanker, & Taylor, 1998; Seyfarth,
Cheney, & Marler, 1980), we get Table 1.
The table informs us that a difference between human
and non-human communication is not in arbitrary, learned,
or voluntary use of signs.3 Nor is it the added condition that
Table 1
The use of arbitrary signs in six species.
Species: VM ES Gray parrot Bonobo BD Human
Unit of comm.: AC Song Word Lexigram SW NL exp.
Arbitrary ? ? þ þ þ þ
Learned * þ þ þ þ þ
Voluntary  ? þ þ þ þ
Natural þ þ   þ þ
Disp. ref.   ? þ ? þ
Phys. uncount.      þ
VM: vervet monkey; ES: European starling; BD: bottlenose dolphin; unit
of comm.: unit of communication; AC: alarm call; SW: signature whistle;
NL exp.: natural language expression; *: the functions of vervets’ calls
seem to be learnedwhile the forms are innate; disp. ref.: used potential for
spatiotemporally displaced reference; phys. uncount.: physically
uncountable number of communication units.
Observe that the word ‘uncountable’ is not used here in its common set-
theoretic sense (to mark the difference between countably and
uncountably inﬁnite sets). On the contrary: I claim that the number of
possible NL expressions is ﬁnite but unbounded – in the sense that one
can always add another up to a certain ﬁnite limit that is never reached.
The ﬁnity of NL comes from viewing language as a physical computational
system rather than a purely mathematical object. As the spacetime that
can support physical computational systems is ﬁnite (Krauss & Starkman,
2000), physical computational systems cannot, differently from mathe-
matical objects, accommodate inﬁnity. Thus, language is a physically
uncountable ﬁnite set – it has a ﬁnite number of elements (NL expres-
sions) that cannot be physically counted (Luuk & Luuk, 2011). Other
physically uncountable ﬁnite sets include, e.g. the number of atoms in
Jupiter or the Solar System at a given moment etc.
5 Although it may be argued that the uncountability relies not so much
on cognitive abilities as on syntax, cognitive processing must support the
syntactically induced uncountability.
6 In language evolution, as opposed to the evolution of cognitive abil-
ities underlying language, some degree of group selection must be
assumed. It is not very adaptive to talk to oneself. Thus, the very fact that
language has evolved is an evidence of group selection. On the other
hand, the underlying cognitive abilities were probably adaptive for the
individual (e.g. in behavioral planning) and thus, a target of individual
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Theoretically, a difference could be in naturally occurring
spatiotemporally displaced reference (Janik et al. (2006) did
not investigate this possibility with bottlenose dolphins).
However, there is a clear-cut difference in the number of
signs used. The use of NL expressions by humans is the only
natural communication system with a physically
uncountable number of signs (Chomsky, 1995; Hauser,
Barner, & O’Donnell, 2007; Hauser et al., 2002). (The
concession ‘natural’ has to be made as humans have
contrived such artiﬁcial systems as well.) This enormous
difference between human and non-human communica-
tion begs an explanation. While an enhanced mnemonic
support, related to the distributed nature of symbolic
reference and to almost connectedness in NL signal–signal
associations (Deacon, 1997; Ferrer-i-Cancho, Riordan, &
Bollobas, 2005) may explain it partly, this does not say
much about the conceptual structure required to support
these features. One explanation is that non-humans may
lack the capacity for mental time travel4 (Suddendorf &
Corballis, 2007; but see Correia, Dickinson, & Clayton,
2007; Osvath, 2009). Other possibly uniquely human
prerequisites for this uncountability would be, e.g. rela-
tional reinterpretation (representing higher-order relations
between perceptual relations – Penn, Holyoak, & Povinelli,
2008) or theory of mind (the ability to attribute mental
states to oneself and others – Premack &Woodruff, 1978). It
is also proposed that a neurally implemented capacity for
syntactic recursion differentiates humans from non-4 Spatiotemporally displaced reference implies mental time travel (the
ability to mentally project oneself forwards or backwards in time) but not
vice versa.humans (Chomsky, 2010; Hauser et al., 2002). There are
several hypotheses about human cognitive preadaptations
for an increased (or even physically uncountable5) number
of signs, and at least one of them might hold.
The adaptivity of a communication system with
uncountable number of meaningful signs lies in detailed
context-independent information. Importantly, informa-
tion about past and future events, other contexts and pla-
ces, both real and imaginary, is not adaptive per se.
However, detailed context-independent information is
necessary for the group’s elaborate and coordinated
behavioral planning, which is adaptive. 6 In addition,
a communication system with uncountable number of
signs is necessary for recording the group’s past experience
(e.g. in songs), which in turn supports coordinated behav-
ioral planning. It is not incidental that these two aspects
(recording the group’s experience, and the group’s elabo-
rate and coordinated behavioral planning) together deﬁne
culture. Boyd and Richerson (1982, 1990) have argued for
group selection based on cultural variation over group
selection on genetic variation.
Below I attempt to pin down the hierarchical nature of
symbolic reference in more linguistic and/or semiotic
terms. As mentioned in the Introduction, there is
a consensus on two features distinguishing language from
non-human communication systems: semantically
compositional syntax and learned symbolic reference (e.g.
Deacon, 1997; Hauser et al., 2002; Hurford, 2004). Both of
these features boil down to connectedness in signal–signal
association (Ferrer-i-Cancho et al., 2005). Many non-
human species, on the other hand, seem to be close to
a perfect communication system – perfect in the sense that
every object is mapped to a distinctive signal. Thus, I
submit that the main difference between linguistic and
non-human signs is that in the latter the referent7 is pre-
determined, whereas in the former it is uniquely (and
frequently, in parallel) determined by distinct interpreta-
tive correlates. These correlates are: 1. mental imagery, 2.
denotation (isolating a possible referent “in the world”), 3.
paradigmatic connotation (logico-categorical relations
between concepts), 4. syntagmatic connotation (logico-
grammatical relations between concepts), and 5. deﬁnition
(describing the referent with other symbols). All these
interpretative correlates have been acknowledged in the
literature before but, to my knowledge, they have not been
treated together in a systematic fashion. The overallselection.
7 I use the word ‘referent’ in the broadest possible sense here: that
which is referred to by a sign. I am well aware that this is unorthodox, as
philosophers frequently conﬂate reference with denotation (Hurford,
1998). However, Cambridge Encyclopedia of Philosophy cites reference as
a more general term than denotation (Nute, 1995).
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tremendous (denotation, deﬁnition) to scant (syntagmatic
connotation). I can only suspect that the authors’ frame-
works, convictions and/or limited knowledge of the subject
have always barred some of them (e.g. mental imagery or
syntagmatic connotation) from their sight. For example,
formal semantics is programmatically (and probably
already terminologically) blind to all the other correlates
except denotation (extension) and deﬁnition (intension). 8
With these ﬁve interpretative correlates at our disposal,
we seldom, if ever, fail to interpret a symbol known to us.
The identity of the referent of a symbol X is hardly ever an
issue, since a symbol may have different referents under
different interpretations. Moreover, being, in each inter-
pretation, distributed between a subset of these correlates
ensures a degree of precision which is usually sufﬁcient for
referent recognition. In this sense, any set of the ﬁve
interpretative correlates evaluated in an instance of inter-
pretation of a symbol is its reference. This constitutes the
vast difference between the human symbolic capacity and
the non-human use of symbols (if there is any – this
depends on our deﬁnition of ‘symbol’ – cf. Bickerton, 2003;
Christiansen & Kirby, 2003; Deacon, 1997). One obvious
advantage of the human symbolic capacity is the ﬂexibility
it bestows to our understanding (which, however, comes
with a tradeoff in interpretation unambiguity). Another, as
pointed out by Deacon (1997), is its superior mnemonic
support. The produced referents of a symbol are sampled in
memory, and serve as aids for future interpretations for not
just that one particular symbol but for a set of related
symbols. Plausibly, the human symbolic capacity and the
syntactic compositionality of language display some
dependencies which allow to align the evolutionary scale
of one with that of the other. Below I will elaborate on the
interpretative correlates in more detail.
3.1. S–S and S–R links
Denotation, connotation and deﬁnition are more
complex than S–S and S–R links. They subsume S–S and S–
R links but the links do not imply denotation, connotation
or deﬁnition. The main difference between the two groups
is that the links do not have to be conceptuallymediated. As
the links are available to a vast number of species
(including humans), they constitute a distinct primitive
mechanism that evolution can build on. Thus, the links
(both conditioned and unconditioned) predate all the other
correlates. For example, the roundworm Caenorhabditis
elegans has a simple nervous system comprised of only 302
neurons and is capable of several types of associative
learning (Ishihara et al., 2002).
Vervet monkeys provide another possible example.
Although their alarm calls denote four different predator
classes (snakes, birds of prey, large cats, primates – Hauser,
1997), this may be obvious to us but not to the monkeys. I
suggest that emotional signals getting associated with8 Alternatively, intension is sometimes deﬁned negatively as “anything
referred to by the sign that is not (part of) its extension”, which, if
conﬂated with deﬁnition, guarantees the blindness.situation-speciﬁc ﬂee responses would be a more parsi-
monious interpretation of the origin of vervets’ alarm calls.
The argument is as follows. The only thing that needs
explaining is different signals for different predator
contexts. As having different signals for different predator
contexts enhances vervets’ ﬁtness, the differentiation of
signals can be attributed to natural selection. For this, prey
individuals need to provide only two types of links for
natural selection to work upon: the one between predation
pattern and ﬂee pattern, and the other between ﬂee pattern
and call pattern. As for the link mechanism, conditioned S-
R would be sufﬁcient for both. Crucially, a conscious link
between predation pattern and call pattern, available to
humans, is unnecessary. It has been argued that humans
are unique in being able to form ‘stimulus equivalence’
classes of abstract and unrelated stimuli, e.g. if taught to
match A with B and B with C, they will spontaneously
match A with C by transitivity (Dickins, 2003; but see
Eichenbaum, 2000). I suggest that even if vervets had such
a capacity, it would not be required by natural selection for
selecting for distinct alarm calls associated with different
ﬂee responses. Vervets’ putative arbitrary reference to
things or events “in the world” (denotation) is thus a non-
parsimonious alternative to conditioned response (cf.
Soltis, 2009).
3.2. Mental imagery and denotation
Mental imagery is primarily accessible to introspection,
an arguably repudiated source of information. However,
mental imagery is also a proliﬁc ﬁeld of study in cognitive
science. Despite its name, it is generally agreed upon that
mental imagery is not conﬁned to one (i.e. visual) sensory
modality (Belardinelli et al., 2004; Cooper, 1995; Pylyshyn,
2003). However, there is some debate on whether mental
imagery is per se polysensory or comes in different
modalities similar to sensory modalities (visual, auditory,
haptic, etc. – Bensaﬁ et al., 2003; Klatzky, Lederman, &
Matula, 1991; Reisberg, Wilson, & Smith, 1991).
It is well established that both spontaneous and induced
mental imagery have positive effects on text comprehen-
sion (Anderson & Kulhavy, 1972; Gambrell & Bales, 1986;
Long, Winograd, & Bridge, 1989; Sadoski, 1983, 1985;
Thibaut, Rondal, & Kaens, 1995). Language concreteness, its
capacity to evoke mental images, has been shown to be one
of the most effective determiners of comprehension and
learning (Sadoski, Goetz, & Fritz, 1993; Wharton, 1980).
There is ample evidence that language comprehension
involves the activation of mental imagery of the content of
utterances (Barsalou, Simmons, Barbey, & Wilson, 2003;
Just, Newman, Keller, McEleney, & Carpenter, 2004;
Richardson, Spivey, McRae, & Barsalou, 2003; Stanﬁeld &
Zwaan, 2001; Zwaan, Stanﬁeld, & Yaxley, 2002). In sum,
there is sufﬁcient evidence to include mental imagery
among symbol’s interpretative correlates.
Moreover, insofar as there is any substance to concep-
tualization, it is probably reducible to an equivalent of
mental imagery. This seems necessary, as all the other
correlates describe mental relations. As any relation, even
an abstract and complex one, would have to be a relation
between something, it follows that mental imagery is the
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tualization. It also follows that all conceptually mediated
mental relations (denotation, both types of connotations,
deﬁnition) should presuppose conceptual content, i.e.
mental imagery. Only S–S and S–R links, as preconceptual
mental relations, can do without. For example, the deno-
tation of the word rat requires imagining (or retrieving
a memory image of) a speciﬁc creature ‘in the world’,
otherwisewe could not understand theword in thewaywe
do, irrespective of whether there is a rat in sight or not.
Plausibly, the same holds for all other conceptually
mediated relations. Connotations and deﬁnitions
frequently (although perhaps not necessarily) activate
mental images, and even those that do not evoke mental
images directly can recruit mental imagery at various
stages of their composition. For example, the phrase furi-
ously sleeping green idea, standing for a concept without
denotation, connotes other concepts, e.g. ‘green’, which in
turn can recruit mental imagery. If the same holds for
‘furiously’ (which is likely), one can arrive at a crude
approximation of the concept of furiously sleeping green
idea by combining the mental images of these two
constituents. The relevance of the concept would be further
reinforced by the correct way of combining the mental
images, viz. by complementing the semantic frame of the
phrase [x y-ing in z way] with mental images of ‘green’ and
‘furiously’ for x and z, respectively. 9 Observe that the
resulting concept, while crude and subjective, could, if
memorized, be used to uniquely identify furiously sleeping
green idea – an identiﬁcation motivated by the lack of other
unique identiﬁers, viz. denotation and deﬁnition. More-
over, although the resulting concept and its uniqueness are
subjective, the concept’s derivation is fully objective, i.e.
a certain similarity is expected between the concepts of
furiously sleeping green idea of any two people. Of course,
the derivation (and, correspondingly, the concept) would
be very similar to that of, e.g. furiously resting green idea,
furiously resting green thought, furiously reposing green
slumber etc. This should not pose a problem, as the type of
combination is sufﬁciently rare for a subjectively unique
identiﬁcation in normal (i.e. metalinguistically untam-
pered) conditions. Thus, and contrary to what Chomsky
(1971 [1957], p. 15) has assumed, the fact that an expres-
sion is nonsensical (lacks denotation or extension ‘in the
world’) does not imply that it is meaningless (as meaning
can be induced by mental imagery, connotation or deﬁni-
tion as well).
Importantly, mental imagery is capable only of
approximating objects rather than modeling them exactly.
But this is so for a good reason. For if mental imagery were
to model objects with perfect accuracy, we would have
trouble distinguishing it from them, i.e. we would be prone
to hallucinations, which would be very maladaptive.
Vagueness, but also extreme ﬂexibility are the prime
features of mental imagery. At the same time, mental
imagery has also strict limitations, e.g. conﬁnement up to
4-dimensional spacetime in the domain of geometry.9 On frame semantics, see Fillmore (1976).In sum, mental imagery is autonomous conceptuali-
zation, affected primarily by conceptualization-internal
constraints, while the other correlates depend heavily on
different external conditions (e.g. the existence of a corre-
sponding entity ‘in the world’ in the case of denotation).
Thus, I hypothesize that an approximation of mental
imagery is a prerequisite of conceptual structure, and that
the species lacking it are incapable of conceptualization,
lack concepts and conceptual structure. Presumably, all the
species we have discussed so far have conceptual structure
and thus some access to an approximation of mental
imagery. While it is true that an approximation of mental
imagery in non-humans can be only inferred and is difﬁcult
to prove, bonobo’s play with an imaginary object (Savage-
Rumbaugh et al., 1998) is an example of evidence of the
species capacity for mental imagery. More generally,
Tomasello and Call (1997) conclude on this topic that
evidence for mental imagery in ape play exists but is
controversial. However, some mental rotation experiments
have provided a more rigorous evidence (Mauck &
Dehnhardt, 1997; Vauclair, Fagot, & Hopkins, 1993).
3.3. Connotation and deﬁnition
Paradigmatic connotation pertains to lexicon and
reﬂects logico-categorical relations between concepts
stored in long-term memory. For instance, white is a para-
digmatic connotation of snow. Paradigmatic connotation
relies on a well-known signiﬁcation phenomenon,
metonymy (reference by proximity or whole-part relation).
As there cannot be predicates without arguments, para-
digmatic connotation pertains also to predicate-argument
structure – at least in modern language, where predicate
paradigmatically connotes argument and vice versa. 10 This
might not have been the case in protolanguage, which, in
all likelihood, had initially only arguments, i.e. noun-like
entities (Heine & Kuteva, 2007; Luuk, 2009, 2010).
However, paradigmatic connotation is a much more
general characteristic of language than predicate-argument
structure (see Section 5).
In language, syntagmatic connotation pertains to
grammar and reﬂects the logico-grammatical syntagmatic
relations a concept steps into. For instance, if (x) then (y) or
(y) if (x) is a syntagmatic connotation of if. As Quine (1960)
has observed, a word like sake can be learned only
contextually – i.e. in our terminology, presupposes
syntagmatic connotation for a referent. The same holds for
all conjunctions and adpositions. Obviously, there cannot
be any syntagmatic connotation before the emergence of
grammar (e.g. in the form of the ﬁrst word order
constraint). More generally, syntagmatic connotation is
a byproduct of ﬁxed sign order. As it is theoretically
possible (albeit evolutionarily unlikely) to have, e.g. afﬁxes
(morphemes with ﬁxed order) before word order
constraints, syntagmatic connotation does not imply word
order constraints. However, as morphemes are signs10 This type of paradigmatic connotation can be more detailed than just
described. For example, verbs paradigmatically connote their speciﬁc
argument roles (Agent, Patient, Beneﬁciary, Goal etc.).
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grammatical constraints in language, there is an equiva-
lence relation between syntagmatic connotation and
grammar in language. However, syntagmatic connotation
is a correlate of ﬁxed order of not just linguistic but any
signs. For example, formulas of cause-effect relation,
implication (x / y) and arithmetic (x þ y ¼ z) exhibit
syntagmatic connotation. Of course, formulas like these are
derivative of language (as is probably our arithmetic
capacity in general – Dehaene, Spelke, Pinel, Stanescu, &
Tsivkin, 1999; Hurford, 1990 [1987]; Nieder, 2005).
Deﬁnition is the higher order correlate that must refer
to other correlates in order to be understood. Suppose that
a deﬁnition M of an unknown symbol N contains an
unknown symbol O, explained in deﬁnition P containing an
unknown symbol Q. In order to be understood, M must
resort to mental imagery, denotation, syntagmatic conno-
tation, paradigmatic connotation, or any combination of
these. In order to be unambiguous, it is necessary (but not
sufﬁcient) thatM be ultimately reducible to a set of known
symbols.Table 2
The evolution of syntax.
(1) Signs
(2) Increased number of signs4. The evolution of syntax
In describing the evolution of syntax, the following
scenario is widely agreed upon: preadaptations
[1]/ protolanguage(/ preadaptations [2]?)/ syntactic
language.
Certain preadaptations [1] were necessary for proto-
language to emerge. 11 Anatomical preadaptations included
changes in the brain anatomy; anatomical preadaptations
for speech included changes in middle and/or inner ear
anatomy, an enhanced thoracic innervation and a re-
conﬁguration of the tongue and vocal tract (Boë et al.,
2007; Fitch, 2000a; MacLarnon & Hewitt, 1999; Martínez
et al., 2004; Wynn, 1998). Depending on one’s theoretical
standpoint, cognitive preadaptations could have been, e.g.
theory of mind, joint reference, double scope-blending,
episodic memory, conceptual embedding, mental time
travel, transitive inference, semantic synthesis, relational
redescription and relational reinterpretation (Bruner, 1975;
Call & Tomasello, 2008; Dessalles, 2008; Fauconnier &
Turner, 2008; Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; Luuk & Luuk, 2008;
Penn et al., 2008; Penn & Povinelli, 2007; Piaget, 1999
[1928]; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; Tulving, 2005). As
protolanguage is, essentially, a language without syntax, it
refers to either a holophrastic (Wray, 1998, 2000) or com-
mutatively concatenated (Jackendoff, 1999) language.
Although protolanguage is culturally downgraded, both
syntactic language and protolanguage are suited for
communication. 12 The main difference is that, in syntactic
language, linguistic form constrains interpretation better11 Alternatively, some of the putative preadaptations could be ascribed
to adaptations for language in the course of coevolution of language and
genetic endowment (cf. Christiansen & Chater, 2008; Fitch, 2008;
Hurford, 2008). However, it is still necessary to posit certain preadapta-
tions to get language evolution off the ground.
12 For example, it has been proposed that the difference between
protolanguage and syntactic language is roughly of the order of that
between pidgin and creole (Bickerton, 1990; Givón, 1998).than in protolanguage. As to why protolanguage was
eventually substituted with syntactic language, the most
plausible explanation is that the transition increased
expressivity (cf. Nowak & Krakauer, 1999; Nowak et al.,
2000). It is unknown whether it was a solely technolog-
ical innovation or required some additional anatomical and
cognitive preadaptations [2]. However, see Hauser et al.
(2002) and Chomsky (2010) for the proposal that the
preadaptations included a neurally implemented recursion.
The evolution toward syntax started with an operation
on elements (signs) of protolanguage. There are only two
possible candidates for this operation: fractionation and
concatenation. The hypothesis that posits fractionation as
the ﬁrst operation is that of a ‘holistic protolanguage’ (e.g.
Wray, 1998, 2000). The hypothesis suggests that holistic
utterances of protolanguage were, in the advent of syntax,
fractured into distinct words. Themain counterargument to
this hypothesis, supported by Johansson’s (2008) calcula-
tion, is that the structure of the holistic utterances would
have been too ambiguous to yield distinct form-meaning
pairs (i.e. words) for the fractioning (Bickerton, 2003;
Johansson, 2008; Tallerman, 2007). Thus, the alternative
hypothesis, that of concatenation as the ﬁrst operation,
would have to be true. The majority of models of the
evolution of syntax subsume this hypothesis (e.g. Dessalles,
2006; Jackendoff, 1999; Johansson, 2006b; Nowak,
Komarova, & Niyogi, 2001; Nowak & Krakauer, 1999;
Nowak et al., 2000). For example, in Jackendoff’s (1999, p.
273) model of language evolution, concatenation precedes
the “use of symbol position to convey basic semantic rela-
tionships”, which implies grammar (cf. Dessalles, 2006;
Johansson, 2006b). An increased number of signs are attes-
ted as a payoff condition for compound signals (Christiansen
& Kirby, 2003; Jackendoff, 1999; Nowak & Komarova, 2001).
Thus, one arrives at Table 2.
The table shows the logical and temporal succession of
stages of the evolution of syntax. The stages are ordered
vertically with each stage describing the achieved state
(e.g. ‘commutative concatenation of signs’ – concatenation
of signs irrespective of their order). Table 2 is hierarchical,
i.e. at each stage the conditions stipulated by the previous
stages (above them) apply as well. This accords with the(3) Commutative concatenation of signs
(4) Grammar – noncommutative concatenation of signs
Table 3
The evolution of symbolic reference.
(a) S–S and S–R links) (1) signs
(b) Denotation/ mental imagery
(c) Paradigmatic connotation) (3) commutative
concatenation
(d) Syntagmatic connotation4 (4) noncommutative
concatenation
(e) Deﬁnition
/,): implication;4: equivalence.
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expunging the earlier stages. The timing of the stages is
relative, i.e. the intervals between themmight not be equal.
5. The evolution of symbolic reference
For communication to work, stage (3) (commutative
concatenation of signs) must have logico-categorical rela-
tionships (i.e. paradigmatic connotation) between the
signs. Assuming the availability of suitable stem categories
at stage (3), the simplest solution would be to concatenate
arguments and predicates, as in [man go]. Alternatively,
with a categorially uniform stem choice, a solution would
be to concatenate different semantic roles, as in [man
forest], interpreted as ‘man go to forest’. In any way, para-
digmatic connotation had to evolve sometime before stage
(3). At the same time, syntagmatic connotation, the main
correlate for interpreting words like sake, if, which, that etc.,
cannot evolve before the ﬁrst grammatical constraint is at
place, i.e. before stage (4). Thus, in deriving the course of
the evolution of symbol, we arrive at Table 3.
There are ﬁve stages in this scale. As in Table 2, the
succession of the stages is logical and temporal; the scale is
hierarchical so that at all stages the conditions speciﬁed by
the previous stages apply as well; the timing of stages is
relative, not absolute. As argued at length above, it is
parsimonious to assume that the scale begins with an
ability to form S–S and S–R links (e.g. conditioned S–R),
accordingly, the mental links are the starting point. Deno-
tation depends on mental imagery but perhaps not vice
versa (cf. Section 3.2). However, a one-way dependency is
difﬁcult to establish here, as little is known about these
correlates in non-humans who are the prime source for
investigating protosymbolic reference. We know only a few
scattered facts, such as that baboons and sea lions have the
capacity for mental imagery and that dolphins may be able
to denote conspeciﬁcs (Janik et al., 2006; Mauck &
Dehnhardt, 1997; Vauclair et al., 1993). The scale ends
with deﬁnition which, normally, should require a full-
blown syntax, but at the very least requires a fully devel-
oped symbolic reference. As I have argued, paradigmatic
connotation is a maintenance condition of stage (3) in Table
2. Thus, at this point, Table 3 can be aligned with Table 2,
with stage (3) having stage (c) as its prerequisite. Stage (a),
S–S and S–R links are a precondition of stage (1), so at this
point Tables 2 and 3 can be aligned as well. Finally, there is
an equivalence relation between (d) syntagmatic conno-
tation and (4) noncommutative concatenation. Compara-
tive evidence suggests that certain non-human species
have attained at least stage (b) (Janik et al., 2006; Mauck &
Dehnhardt, 1997; Osvath, 2009; Savage-Rumbaugh, 1986;
Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1998; Vauclair et al., 1993).
There is some independent evidence as to the reality of
these stages. In modeling a general communication
framework based on Zipf’s law (which holds for NL) with
graph theory, and without referring to the interpretative
correlates (aside from distinguishing denotation from
paradigmatic connotation), Ferrer-i-Cancho et al. (2005)
arrived at the model that corresponds exactly to stage (c)
in Table 3, i.e. a concatenable set of signs with denotation
and paradigmatic connotation but without syntagmaticconnotation and noncommutative concatenation. At the
time of its publication, this result was totally unexpected
and theoretically unexplained. As Ferrer-i-Cancho et al.
(2005, p. 564) wrote: “While researchers are divided
when considering syntax /—/ or symbolic reference /—/ as
the essence of human language, we hypothesize that
syntax and forms of reference higher than mere signal-
object associations are two sides of the same coin, i.e.
connectedness in signal-signal associations” (cf. Sole,
2005). The authors described their model as “a proto-
grammar, from which full human languages can easily
evolve” (Ferrer-i-Cancho et al., 2005, p. 562).
6. Conclusion
This paper attempted to gain an interdisciplinary insight
into the evolution of symbol. It arrived at the following,
rather eclectic but apparently coherent results. Of these
results, 2, 5 and 6 are almost entirely new. The rest build
more on pre-existing, sometimes implicit notions in
arriving at the formulations (in Tables 1–3 and the deﬁni-
tion of symbol) that are at least partly novel.
1. Symbol is deﬁned by the arbitrary nature of reference (a
non-necessary link between a form and its meaning) and
ausedpotential for spatiotemporally displaced reference.
2. Archaeological and anatomical evidence brackets the
earliest evidence for symbolismbetween0.9 and2.3mya.
3. The comparison of the use of arbitrary signs in six
species (vervet monkeys, European starlings, gray
parrots, bonobos, bottlenose dolphins and humans)
shows that a difference between human and non-human
communication is not in arbitrary, learned, voluntary or
natural signs but in the number of signs used. Language
is the only natural communication system with a physi-
cally uncountable number of signs (Table 1).
4. Contrary to some claims (Cheney & Seyfarth, 2005;
Hauser, 1997; Seyfarth et al., 2010), reference to distinct
predator classes is not required to explain the emer-
gence of differentiated natural alarm signal systems (e.g.
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tion are sufﬁcient to explain it.
5. Symbolic reference can be analyzed in terms of ﬁve
interpretative correlates: mental imagery, denotation,
paradigmatic connotation, syntagmatic connotation, and
deﬁnition. I hypothesize that the correlates form a deri-
vational and evolutional sequence, given in theﬁve-stage
evolutionary scale of symbolic reference (Table 3): (a) S–S
and S–R links, (b) denotation and mental imagery, (c)
paradigmatic connotation, (d) syntagmatic connotation,
(e) deﬁnition. I also hypothesize that denotation implies
(an approximation of) mental imagery.
6. At three stages, the evolution of symbol (Table 3) can be
aligned with the evolution of syntax (Table 2): (1) signs,
(2) increased number of signs, (3) commutative
concatenation of signs, (4) grammatical (noncommuta-
tive) concatenation of signs. This scale of syntactic
evolution is compatible with several well-known
scenarios of the evolution of syntax (e.g. Dessalles,
2006; Diessel & Tomasello, 2005; Jackendoff, 1999;
Johansson, 2006b; Nowak & Komarova, 2001; Nowak &
Krakauer, 1999; Nowak et al., 2000). I hypothesize that
the evolutions of syntax and symbol are related in the
following way: (1) signs imply (a) S–S and S–R links, (3)
commutative concatenation implies (c) paradigmatic
connotation, and (4) noncommutative concatenation
and (d) syntagmatic connotation are equivalent.
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